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Words and lesions: epistemological reflections on violence and lessons of the 1968 moment (with particular reference to Japan)

Presuppositions

0.1

The question for our conference fifty years after the 1968 youth protest wave is how to contribute to its evaluation today. First, I assume that the revolted young people – and at least in Japan, USA, and France many citizens – were right in what they were against: to begin with, the US war in Vietnam, a catalyst for all else. If so, what else were they precisely against and how? Moreover, what kind of revolution in which fields were they for, how clearly? And while honouring their important contribution to ending the war in Vietnam, which led to a number of partial improvements, how do we evaluate the undoubted pragmatic failure of other main objectives? My approach is necessarily tentative, itself immersed into a history that flows; it is a hypothetical imperative and epistemic method for better understanding.[1]

0.2

To get at some useful presuppositions, I begin with two of the best encapsulations I know, from two of the best minds of the twentieth century Left, which could provide criteria for situations such as those in 1968. The first is Lenin's characterisation of what is a revolutionary situation: its necessary factors are that the ruled classes *no longer want* the existing order and the ruling class/es *are no longer able to maintain* it. The second is Gramsci's distinction between a revolutionary war of position (as in World War I trenches) and a war of manoeuvre (as in Napoleonic wars or Trotsky's leading the Red Army) (Gramsci, 237). In that light, was there in 1968–70 a revolutionary situation in Japan,

Europe, and the USA (sorrowfully, I omit here Latin America)? Obviously not: first, the native plus the hegemonic national States would have used the *ultima ratio regum*, brute military force, to put it down; second, as demonstrated both in France as of the June 1968 holidays and in Japan after 1968–70, the consumer society would have kept much of the population passive.[2] True, the State power of France, considered singly, could perhaps have been challenged by an intelligent and efficient union of manual and mental workers; however, the enmeshment of native power with the ideological and military might of the international US-led bloc would have, in that case, at best led to a protracted and probably defeated civil war (on the model of Greece after World War II). In Eastern Europe, the State power of Czechoslovakia, considered singly, was even partly and precariously taken over by such plebeian power under Dubček, but the ideological and military might of the USSR-led bloc immediately intervened to smother it.

In Lenin's definition, above, there is for our purposes a missing element which was spelled out by him earlier, and so obvious that he did not think of repeating it: a sufficiently strong ideational and organising group or class fraction that would channel and orchestrate the lower-class discontent into a coherent strategy and tactics. This was present in the successful communist revolutions in the Russian Empire, Yugoslavia, and China, which benefitted from the bitter war between major world powers that distracted them from fully efficient counter-revolutionary intervention, and in the anomalous cases of Cuba and Vietnam that benefitted from the Cold War split. Such a coherent and crystallised group was in 1968 nowhere to be found in the scattered, and often mutually bitterly inimical, oppositional forces. The main horizon of such forces, even in the cases when they included many young workers, was predominantly anarcho-individualistic; it seems the general population, including industrial workers, still had too much to lose after twenty years of what I would call, after Marcuse, the External Warfare with the Internal Welfare State. The position of Japan is probably to be understood as a hybrid case of an economy where after 1945 both the warfare and welfare aspects were atypically weak.

0.3

Finally, how can the approach to the 1968 protests across the world be facilitated? I trust we shall hear in this high-powered meeting various ways, and to begin, I have here chosen three. First, it seems mandatory to demystify the hegemonic reproach of *violence* hurled at them:

therefore, I shall discuss just how might violence be defined and delimited. Second, it is most useful to establish a feedback with historical practice in one or two illuminating historical examples and see how they can be understood in view of the foregoing theorising and how they in turn modify it. Third, I wish to probe the light thrown on the contradictions within 1968 in youth culture on the *exemplum* of the text and performance of Satoh Makoto's and the Kuro Tento company's *Dance of Angels*.

1 For a rectification of 'violence': toward a political epistemology of inflicted lesion

[There is an] urgency to critically theorize the multifarious modalities of violence in a time of perpetual war.

– Setsu Shigematsu, 2012

We aren't going to be the first to resort to violence, but we do reserve the right to defend ourselves.

– Makoto Satoh, 1960

1.1 Approach: denotation and yardsticks

Within what I like to call a political epistemology, I begin with historical semantics and, as Master Kong Fu would put it, a rectification of terms. Here violence is one keyword locking and unlocking our works and days. In both English and German semantics, violence (*Gewalt*), tightly enmeshed and, often in part, overlapping with power (*Macht*) and force (*Kraft*), is part of a semantic cluster of 'power in operation' (Roget, 173) approximating relationships in empirical life and politics. Surveying the vast literature on this, I have (in 'Terms' and 'Comparative' – see 'Works cited' for first word in my book titles) followed the realistic school – say Weber, Mills or Balibar – and considered violence as central to power as we know it. I also briefly surveyed the espousal of revolutionary Counter-Violence (Fanon and Sartre), the espousal of Non-Violence (Gandhi and M.L. King), and a sublation of both in an operative participatory democracy. I would advance today to the position that the main difference is: *power is inherent in any interhuman situation or politics, whereas violence is predicated on the manifold tensions between and inside groups or classes of dominators and dominated.*[3]

The age of imperialist world wars and its corollary of a huge development of military technology is also, as Hobsbawm noted in one of his last books, one of a 'process of barbarisation' in which 'the level

of socially accepted violence … in image and reality' has hugely risen in metropolitan societies (Hobsbawm, 125 and 124), boomeranging back from its export into the colonies; a whole essay in that book (138ff.) mercilessly analysed the decay of 'public order in an age of violence' (Hobsbawm, 2008). The omnipresent force of violence is as of the twentieth century multiplied by the power of technology run mad, spiralling upward from unbelievably multiplied firepower, through tanks, mass artillery, and carpet bombing, to ABC weapons, missiles, and drones, able to wipe out all semblance of civilisation. Violence was in 2002 reported by the World Health Organisation as leading yearly – based on incomplete official statistics and to my mind an incomplete definition – to one million deaths and 'many more' injuries (WHO, 3). However, this blatantly excludes wars, which have in the twentieth century caused, by conservative estimate, 110 million deaths (Sivard, 1996), so that this number would have to be more than doubled (cf. Suvin, 'Capitalism'). And were one to include severe psychical lesions, from prolonged stress to terror, as I argue later, I believe it would embrace hundreds of millions. Therefore, the concept of violence needs careful articulating.

It is most useful to approach this by latching on to Popitz's (1986) pioneering focus, a generation ago, on *harming*;[4] much of the voluminous German writing that followed takes as its strategic insight the focus on destructive *lesion of people*. Popitz's focus clarified the often fuzzy definition of coercion by understanding violence as infliction of harm or lesion by people to other people in pursuit of macro- or micro-power; within this, violence is primarily any upholding by force of an asymmetrical power relationship favourable to the rulers, and then secondarily a reaction to that primary. Only those actions qualify as violence that have significant bodily consequences, usually with irreversible traces. Economic harm to commodities or other property may well be destructive and punishable, but it constitutes violence only if it leads to wounds, hunger, or similar: smashing a shop-window is vandalism, smashing a nose is violence. Confusing things and people is an old ideological monstrosity insisted upon by capitalism, whose Newspeak calls violence any act or behaviour (often arbitrary and ad hoc) transgressing laws and rules centred on profitable property.

On the contrary, following Popitz, I shall posit four initial axioms about violence:

(a) Violence involves, as a necessary factor, *significant physical lesion inflicted by people or groups of people upon the bodily integrity of other people*. This seems to me as near to a formal (not

value-free) initial stance as possible: it allows that violence may be inflicted both by people in power and by rebels, but it also allows us to recognise the beast when we encounter it. Accidents may be deadly but only human will and purpose is violent.

(b) A lengthy separate argument is needed to identify and quantify the agents or carriers of violence. Historically, violence disproportionately often proceeds by means of States in wars or internal repression; I shall therefore in this approach concentrate only on such macro-violence. A State is *always* constituted and safeguarded by violence; Weber even proposes that *Gewaltsamkeit*, systematic potential for violence, coupled with the monopoly of legitimation for it, is what is specific to State (Weber, 7–8; cf. Popitz, 82). It is imprisoned in the vicious circle of 'Social order is necessary for limiting violence – Violence is necessary for safekeeping social order' (Popitz, 89). In a long investigation about terrorism, I found that the most pertinent distinction is one between *individual, group, and State violence* against people, and that as a rule State violence towers above the group violence by a factor of at least 1,000:1 or more, possibly nearer to 2,000:1.[5] Therefore, I shall here also disregard the important group violence, say by gangs and political and/or religious groups.[6]

(c) I have, in Master Dōgen's terms, 'a deep confidence in causality' (Shōbōgenzō, 218, and cf. 'Shinjin inga', 213ff.) – though not in the rigid monocausality of old-style politics and physics. Thus, my third axiom is that the two major, and mutually reinforcing, *causal factors* of violence are internal and outward *State violence* based since the rise of capitalism on, but not fully determined by, the capillary and omnipresent everyday *alienation in work conditions* and its repercussions on all domains of human relationships, beginning with the family. The factor operating in this axiom is often called 'structural violence', 'institutionalised violence' or 'systemic violence'. Its best example may be extreme poverty leading to horrendous results of death by hunger and/or avoidable diseases, at present threatening probably more than 3 billion people.

(d) *Violence is psychophysical*. It is bound up with injurious impingements on a human person even when there is no present or overt physical lesion. Violence is, as Keen (1988) argues, most intimately tied not only to group and personal interests but also to group and personal imagination or mental encyclopedias (for example, defining certain human groups as not fully

or really human). Tying violence to a broad concept of bodily integrity and to social production of experiential traumas means that not only is the passion for integrity of possessions here irrelevant, but the insistence on purely physical lesions is insufficient.[7]

However, on the one hand, a grounding only in today's official medical and State-sponsored categories is perhaps up to a point useful but inadequate to account for the full impact of violence. Yet on the other hand, we do not quite know how to take into account invisible and deep wounds to our imagination or psyche. Blithely obfuscating them as non-existent, the ruling classes in all major centres of power and production have concluded we live in the best of all possible worlds.

I am therefore proposing, as a thought experiment, that we imagine a society of total dystopian quiescence or stasis with a strongly dominant power apparatus, improved and globalised from the model of Huxley's *Brave New World* or Orwell's *1984,* of their Great Ancestor, Zamyatin's *My* (*We*), and of their many offspring in the new maps of hell of Science Fiction: since we are today not that far from it, this should not be hard to imagine. In such a dystopian society a brainwashed as well as self-interested political alliance, led by the ruling classes, could for entire generations block any effective striving toward social justice and easier living in major world centres of power and production. Poorer and less powerful peripheries of the world would be easily neutralised by metropolitan imperialisms, severely oppressing them while using the peripheral populations as threatening bugaboos. True, the metropolitan lower classes, constituting a large majority, would in this case be leading a psychophysically very unhealthy way of life, with hugely rising illnesses and shorter life-spans. Also, ecological depletion would run wild, resulting in irreversible 'capitalocene' – damages to air, water, soil, fauna, and flora, and clearly pointing to civilisational collapse. Yet the repressive forces of a nanophysically armed police and military, using also robotic machines, and huge propaganda machines inside the decaying metropolitan States could sweep under the carpet most major physical harm; the only visible violence would come from increasingly numerous amok-runners, as today in the USA, groups or loners easily explainable by hegemonic propaganda as biologically crazed and evil.

Could we then say that – except for those explained-away events – a non-violent situation existed in the death-dominated type of society sketched in my mental experiment? Almost all the 'unique thought' mass media today, perpetuating 'massive historical amnesia'

(Vodopivec, 2018), would say so, but this does not really hold. First, it is impossible that foreign imperialist and chauvinist violence would not infect the society of the metropolitan States. The condition of perpetual brutal warfare without and within the borders, conveyed by all mass media and most 'entertainment', shapes the whole spread of human relationships and creates a quintessentially racist and fascist split that puts certain types of people beyond the pale of humanity, so that inhumanity to them – to refugees from the most crass war violence, say today's 'immigrants', legal or not – can be denied and practised as normal. The same holds for gender oppression, the second largest injury to humanity. To put it in terms of Freud's polarisation (after World War I) between Eros and Death, both overt and covert violence most actively clusters near the pole of Death. I conclude from this thought experiment that, even in such an extreme, but not unrecognisable model, concepts of individual and even group violence do not suffice as an explanation. We need to find ways to counteract overarching and proliferating structural violence – which is what the 1968 movements rose against.[8] An obsession with killing and death, or with a Schmittian definition of politics as irreconcilable enmity between 1 and 0, is prima facie evidence that violence obtains.

If so, two main questions arise. First, what yardstick might be found to confirm the presence of violence, delimit its extent, and characterise its impact? Second, can we foreground and articulate the concept of just counter-violence, which I shall argue springs from collective self-defence against ruling oppressive violence?

As concerns the *extent* of violence, I propose that we begin with two criteria, the infringement of which would be yardsticks for violence: first, *length of psychophysically sane life*; second, *quality of that life in terms of humanisation*, that is, decreasing alienation of people from each other, work or creation, nature, and other supreme goods (cf. Marx, *Writings*, 216–314, and Fromm).

The first criterion can be partly and approximately, but rather persuasively, quantified insofar as it involves not only premature death but also more or less recognisable health threats: wounds, illnesses, breakdown, etc. There is an approximation to such a procedure in the sensational findings by Stuckler et al. on post-USSR Russia (see also Stuckler and Basu). Using state of art statistical methods, the Stuckler team concluded that '[m]ass privatisation programmes [in post-communist countries, especially in the former Soviet Union from 1989 to 2002] were associated with an increase in short-term adult male mortality rates of 12.8%' (Stuckler, King, and McKee). Their findings are limited to percentages, but we are here speaking of millions of added

deaths, often involving huge stress and unsafe alcohol consumption, and bigger in absolute numbers than the much-cited casualties in Vietnam and Cambodia during protracted warfare.

As to the second criterion, quality of humanised life, I am not aware how it could be quantified. But with some good will, surely it could be described and pointed at, with key factors, including freedom, sufficient income, and social support (cf. Helliwell et al.), who attempt to supplement it with healthy life expectancy, trust, and generosity).

Since these two criteria are interlocked, there is no sociometric definition of violence. Rather, we must recur to some combination of quantitatively ponderable elements from the first criterion with imponderable but qualitatively evaluable factors from the second one. The stance or *Haltung* of the evaluators must in that case be clearly articulated and persuasive (cf. Suvin, both titles on *Haltung*). But we must hold to Dōgen's stance: 'It is obvious that you feel effects when you have created the causes' (*Shōbōgenzō,* 220). And further:

> When you experience and explore the Buddha World Law [*dharma*], you must above all have clarity about cause and effect. If you deny it, you can easily lapse into avidity and cut off the roots of goodness. Generally, the truth about cause and effect is vitally obvious, it is not a matter of personal opinion. (*Shōbōgenzō*, 223)

1.2 On 'structural violence'

I am therefore at the point where I believe we must face the existence and *even causal preponderance of structural violence* in the historical societies of 1968 – or 2018 – without explaining it away as hard-wired biology in which man must always be wolf to man (with apology to wolves). This violence from above is found in and because of poverty, hunger, absence of proper medical care, silenced political voices, and other achievements of the 'capitalocene' (cf. Galtung both titles, clearest in 1996, 197–208). The prototype and matrix of structural violence is to be found, it seems, in patriarchal domination over women and warrior appropriation of slaves from armed raids, at the point where tribal society is changing to class society.

Even *threats*, whenever bolstered by the terror of believable future violence, constitute an injurious impingement on bodily integrity. Their shocks are always psychical, but often in some preliminary or long-duration ways also physical, so that major believable threats must be understood as core elements of violence (see Popitz, 76). They exist in people's hugely emotional imagination, as a *pars pro toto* and indication for a violation of personal integrity. Frantz Fanon wrote, in indignant

protest and description of experience, of colonisation's psychophysical indignities being overtly repressive and inflicting wounds on human identity and self-esteem, which will then determine that decolonisation will always be a violent phenomenon (Fanon, 'De la violence', 27–79): this can be applied to most forms of oppression, exploitation, and humiliation. Hunger, psychic pain and outraged humiliation, for example, loss of steady job and income, constitute as deep a lesion of human freedom, including the four Rooseveltian freedoms (of expression and religious worship, and from want and fear); their violations lead directly to physical consequences of stress, alcoholism plus drugging, homicide, and suicide. The extent of such structural violence is almost unimaginable; according to World Bank data from 2001 2,800, million people or 44 per cent of humankind (today surely over 50 per cent) fell under the ridiculous limit of US$ 2.15 per day, and a similar percentage applies to lack of basic sanitation and ratio of stunted children; no wonder that about half of all people alive live, on average, half as long as the rest (Pogge, 97–8). If we add to these other survival basics threatened by life in capitalist precariate, such as: hydra-headed marginalisation and bureaucratic exclusion, in turn causing violent individual and collective retaliations, as well as 'slow' (that is, backgrounded) violence caused by climate change, toxic drift, deforestation, oil spills, and the environmental aftermath of war (cf. Luhmann and Nixon) – other billions would be involved, practically constituting a huge majority of world people. All these lesions deny human equality faced with pain, death, and the deep contradictions of life, difficult enough on their cosmobiological own even without the whips of war, deprivation, and terror consubstantial with violence and with unequal access to goods. On the contrary, the horizon of all artistic and other cognitive wisdom is to render steadily visible, audible or otherwise sensorially available the supreme good of freedom: self-determination and informed choice.

In sum, whether physical lesion or believable threat, violence denies a basic human right, Jefferson's insurrectionary triad of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Jefferson, 1772). This is the right to freedom in the human community and commonalty; its breach and denial necessarily includes but often much transcends point-like and visible lesion and pain: injustice has the same semantic root as the word injury (in Latin, a wrong). For Marx, *people's collective and distributive freedom* based on their needs and desires is the horizon making sense of human history as self-determination. However, the realm of freedom can appear only as the swerve from iron necessities imposed by societies based on antagonistic classes, as value measuring exploitative and fetishist alienations, as potentiality or possibility opposed to the rulers' violent

power – as a society of 'associated producers' (Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, 1875).

1.3 On counter-violence as self-defence

An important question is *when is violence justified*, for what political ends and in which measure.

First, it should be obvious that not all violence – whether by States, individuals or groups, and whatever its excuse may be – is allowable: for example, killing civilians in declared or undeclared wars, or any torturing. All violence testifies to a profound sickness of the system generating it and of the group or persons using it.

Nonetheless, there is a most important categorical exception – the *self-defence* is recognised by most historical systems. If it aims to counteract and minimise societal violence as a whole and to diminish its causes, this may justify *counter-violence*. To adapt an argument from Hobbes, I have come to the conclusion – as finally did Thoreau, Martin L. King, and even it seems Gandhi – that *counter-violence is not so hurtful as the want of it*. When individual and communal human rights are routinely violated, oppressed people can and should react, first by using their 'power of disbelief', in order to recognise the disinformation and cultural lies used to keep them in their place, and then by 'coming together' in collective action (cf. the pioneering arguments by Marcuse, 'Problem', and Janeway; also the testimony by Williams).

For, central to and constitutive of violence is a denial of personal psychophysical integrity as a basic human need and right. What is injured together with the body is 'human freedom … claimed exclusively for the violator at the expense of the victim subjected to necessity' (von Trotha, 31). This is most clear in mass wars and in concentration camps, from Vorkuta and Auschwitz to today's proliferation of Guantanamos, Abu Ghraibs, and anti-immigrant camps, but most widespread through the structural violence of poor food, water, air, working ambience, and so on. It amounts to an overt or covert racism that classifies certain types of people as not Us but Them, a literal de-humanisation so that inhumanity to them can be masked, denied, and induced as normal. The Nazis were unsurpassed masters in such pseudo-speciation or *fake categorisation* (say in the inscription 'To the showers' in the gas chambers, cf. Horowitz); however, they had precursors in all historical States, and we have seen their readily identifiable, if less sincere, racist and sexist followers all around us ever since (cf. also hooks's stance of a black feminist revolutionary on the US White supremacy). No particular

grouping propagating such inhuman values has the right to deny basic humanity. In Marcuse's harsh but inescapable terms, centred on the principle that 'freedom of thought involves the struggle against inhumanity', it follows that,

> in a democracy [the right to subversion] is vested … in the majority of the people. This means that the ways should not be blocked on which a subversive majority could develop, and if they are blocked by organized repression and indoctrination, their reopening may require apparently undemocratic means. They would include the withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements that promote aggressive policies, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or that oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc. (Marcuse,'Repressive', 45)

Semantic and pragmatic examples of collective self-defence against inhumanity abound in the last 150 years. Let me only mention the argument of world systems theory about 'anti-systemic' violence – that is, popular protests around the world against the violent introduction of capitalism from Cortez to the present (cf. Arrighi et al., 1989) – then the abolition and Black liberation movements in Haiti or the USA, Lenin's contracting out of the huge slaughters of World War I in 1917, all the antifascist struggles culminating in the uprisings in occupied Europe and Asia, and the worldwide decolonisation wave after World War II that peaked with the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. The literary examples would include utopian science fiction ranging from Morris's *News from Nowhere* to Zamyatin's *We*, Le Guin's *The Dispossessed,* and Piercy's *Woman on the Edge of Time*. I discussed in my 'Terms' two powerful encapsulations in favour of counter-violence. First, Machiavelli citing Livy's Samnite leader of anti-Roman resistance who claimed that the arms – as a metonymy for violence – are holy where the only hope reposes in them (*pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est* – 95, citing Livius IX.1). Second, Brecht's Joan Dark amid the slaughterhouses: 'Only violence helps, where violence reigns, and/ Only people help, where people live' (*Es hilft nur Gewalt, wo Gewalt herrscht, und/Es helfen nur Menschen, wo Menschen sind* (Brecht, 224). If there ever was such an almost black-and-white confrontation of democracy against the unholy, it was the antifascist aspect of the 1933–45 struggle.

Thus, counter-violence is inescapable in situations involving armed repression by the police, military or private mercenaries, because 'the

institutionalised violence … autonomously determines the framework of legality and can restrict it to a suffocating minimum' (Marcuse, 'Problem', 89). After many painful experiences, 'for the student generation of the 1960s it suddenly became clear that violence could have a liberating purpose' (Stedman Jones, 38). The experience of the 1960s protests shows 'that the others practice violence, that the others are the violence, and that against this violence legality is problematic …' (Marcuse, 'Problem', 89).[9] This does not mean disallowing, but on the contrary allying with, the parallel right of resistance in self-defence with nonviolent intervention.

> [Nonviolent intervention] can range from civil disobedience within a legal system to revolutionary actions outside or against that system. This can include noncooperation (as in the refusal to obey unjust laws or customs, refusal to pay taxes, refusal of conscription or military orders, or refusal to obey prison rules); boycotts of products, goods, and behaviour; withdrawal of services (private or public); forbidden marches; sit-ins, blockades, occupations, and other trespasses; … and, more recently, the unauthorized release of electronic information (Moylan, 188).[10]

An example: Mandela claimed at his trial that the military section of the African National Congress, founded after the Sharpeville massacre, was designed to focus attacks on material infrastructure 'in order to bring down apartheid without harming human lives' (in Ukai 240 and http://1en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umkhonto_we_Sizwe) – though it should be noted the actual bombings proved this was not always possible.

A stress on polarisation between justifiable violence and the remaining unjustifiable forms then becomes mandatory; it necessarily centres on State militarised repression but should also include reactive groups and individuals internalising the institutionalised violence. The polarisation is analogous to the Buddhist split between enlightened and unenlightened anger or indignation:

> In its awakened form, anger brings good to the world. It is the energy that inspires great movements for freedom and social justice. It helps us be honest about our foibles and show a loved one how they are damaging themselves … In its unenlightened form, though, anger is aggression. It is the cause of endless suffering, from personal hurt to global warfare (McLeod, 44).

Or, in Marcuse's terms: 'What is to be rejected is an a priori doctrine of 'preaching nonviolence' [that] reproduces the existing institutionalised violence' (Marcuse, 'Problem', 90).

This has been most memorably formulated in the final two articles of the Jacobin *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* of 1793, that bourgeois jurisprudence denounces as inapplicable (to its interests):

Article 34: Il y a oppression contre le corps social, lorsqu'un seul de ses membres est opprimé. Il y a oppression contre chaque membre lorsque le corps social est opprimé.

Article 35: Quand le gouvernement viole les droits du peuple, l'insurrection est, pour le peuple et pour chaque portion du peuple, le plus sacré des droits et le plus indispensable des devoirs (1793, 5)

[The societal body is oppressed when any of its members is oppressed. All members are oppressed when the societal body is oppressed.

When government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is the most sacred right and the most indispensable duty of the people and of any part of the people.]

Here, Weber's approach is not too far from Lenin and Trotsky (as he expressly acknowledged). Having defined the State as a relation of domination of people over other people based on systematic violence which is assumed as legitimate (Weber, 9), it follows that the politician who does not resist evil by means of violence 'is *responsible* for evil prevailing' (ibid., 56–7). No religion or movement in politics – that is, dealing in violent power – has been able to avoid 'a pact with the devil' and the ensuing tension between saving one's soul and furthering even one's highest political cause (ibid., 60, and cf. the whole discussion on pp.55–66). This is the Faustian aporetic curse of class society: either pact with the devil or irrelevance in major matters of survival and justice. But the devil exacts a price: 'violence is … never permitted, but forced. Even where this violence leads to victory, that victory is a defeat' (Boer, 16). I read this as meaning that the 'forced' counter-violence is permissible even when fraught with long-range dangers, so that keeping it to the necessary minimum must remain a permanent objective. This double bind can only be solved by inducing new cognition from practice to step out of it (cf. Bateson, 1972).

2 On the '1968 Moment': characteristics of violence, the defeat, and the cost

> [This text is] far from being just a curated sequence of incidents and personalities, tropes have recurred. They certainly are not 'essential' characters that add up to a grand theory. Let's call them leitmotifs.
>
> – William Andrews, 2016

2.1 Premises

A useful encapsulation on the 1960s is by Alessandro Russo:

> The sixties were a worldwide political mass laboratory composed of an unprecedented range of themes and experimental grounds …
>
> [E]verything that involved forms of 'government' of the lives of others was tackled 'politically'; with the term of 'politics' meaning all endeavours that aim at deconstructing the ritual hierarchies of the social world and freeing the subjective potential of anyone in any field. (Russo, 138 and 140)

Within this irruption of everyday anguishes and sufferings into the political conflict, my *general premise* is that a goodly amount of sterling work, say from Mutō Ichiyo to the present day, should have by now made it clear, even to those benighted among us who hide behind comparative literature and culture to minimise our ignorance about the Japanese language and writing, that any national exceptionalism from the normal requirements of epistemology (be it US, Japanese or French) will not hold water. However much of *The Communist Manifesto* ought today to be supplemented or even changed, I wish to begin affirming its central thesis:

> The [written] history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles … [O]ppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (Marx, 1848)

I attempted to demonstrate in an exegesis ('Uses') that the latent figure that has in the *Manifesto* the role of mandator and guarantor is the

classical Naked Truth – much akin to Venus as the Naked Beauty, only updated as being actively repressed. This figure is an emblem of the power proper to it, that of tearing off the veils – that is, the power to render Justice clear-sighted by removing the bandage from her eyes, by curing the blindness that is ignorance. This fuses the horizon of sociopolitical imagination with depth currents of topological imagination and poetic justice.

A warning: alas, I am, in my whole presentation, unable to go into the gender implications of the 1968 moment. That should be done, to my mind by a mixed-gender team, for it was all across the world a *major* failing of the youth movement that it used women as helpers and warrior's rest, so to speak, if not as exploitable objects (cf. for Japan, Shigematsu, 2012). Before such a team I would defend the underlying figure of 'naked Truth' as proper to all liberation movements, as well as its filiation to the – then unavoidable – male-gaze figure of the foam-born, Anadyomene.

My *particular premise* for all the 1960s and early seventies youth protests in the northern hemisphere is what I'll call *the triple boom*: in *births* after World War II, in *economic production*, and in a partial *class compromise* on Keynesian or Welfare State lines in order to forestall what was seen as the threat of communism (stronger in the 'North Atlantic' area than in Japan). The demographic surge – which in the USA began already with the New Deal – created a large cohort brought up in the relative security of an expanding middle class. This was also the first generation to grow up with longer, almost universal elementary education and with television in their homes, therefore glimpsing a single world with its major events, even if in truncated ways and with a frenzied exaltation of consumerism US-style. However, the best of its generation felt the environment in which it grew up as hugely menacing, militarised and authoritarian. Its favourite philosopher formulated it well at the time:

> The union of growing productivity and growing destruction; the brinkmanship of annihilation; the surrender of thought, hope, and fear to the decisions of powers that be; the preservation of misery in the face of unprecedented wealth constitute the most impartial indictment [of this society]. (Marcuse, *One Dimensional*, xiii)

A major factor on the dark and alienating side of this planetary consciousness was the all-pervasive atmosphere and excuse of the *Cold*

War. The threat of immediate destruction to everybody through mass nuclear warfare was in many countries reinforced by classroom bomb drills, and brought to an exasperated point by the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. It was formulated well as the major factor of youth by the 'Port Huron Statement' (1962): '… the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract "others" we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time.' The not yet causally identified destructive forces afoot were symbolised by the nuclear bomb, and then by the US war against the Vietnam people.

As this generation grew to be 20 years old in the late sixties, both idealism and realism made an anti-war protest mandatory, and the heroic resistance of the small colonial people of Vietnam, as well as of the US Blacks, became its global focus. As I remember, Vietnam was for that generation not merely an object of solidarity but primarily a sudden ray of hope against the giant empires: things could be otherwise! A small people, if united, disciplined, and imbued with revolutionary fervour, can successfully challenge the Leviathanic hegemony. All of this shaped from the mid-1950s on a vigorous dissenting culture of the young, a cultural and political generation gap to which I can personally testify. A representative and encouraging sediment appeared – alas without practical consequences – even in the 1958 Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as: 'Nothing that has been created must be so sacred for us that it cannot be surpassed and cede its place to what is still more progressive, more free, more human' (*Yugoslavia's Way*, 263; see for comments Suvin, *Splendour, passim*).

A further important factor was probably that in many countries, for example France and Japan, the baby boomer generation exceeded the absorption capacities of even a Welfare State capitalist economy. In the 1960s the 'crisis of the university' was much discussed in Europe and North America. In Europe as in Japan the university system was abnormally bureaucratic and hierarchical, with rising insecurity as to both access to university and employment chances at graduation. The best French analysts argued that education was growing witlessly specialised, as this society no longer needed – as it had in nineteenth century – an elite of intellectuals, but technicians and junior executives; radical Situationists added that the system now needed a high production of people with degrees but incapable of original thinking. Italian students from Trento appended a witty and deadly description of student as commodity (Ortoleva, 252–8); I shall return to this in the next section.

I do not mean to reduce 1968 protests to a sociobiological agent, youth – a focus that Kristin Ross and William Marotti rightly refuse; student misery, the Situationists pointed out, 'is merely the most gross expression of the colonization of all domains of social practice' (see UNEF – that is, their contemporary bestseller on *The Poverty of Student Life,* 1966). Both manual workers and older citizens were important in the protests, though before the seventies they rarely organised even as loosely as Hansen and Beheiren did in Japan. Nonetheless, both the spear-point or 'catalyst' status (Sasaki-Uemura, 34), the utopian horizon, and the formulations of that revolt belonged to the activist fraction of university and high-school students; the role of young workers was often important, but never decisive. Therefore, I think it is allowable to speak centrally about a *political youth movement*, based on a clear social group (class fraction?) with its own sub-culture.[11] It was a modernist protest movement, in fact not imaginable before Modernism. It was wedded to the 'possible' or 'potential' as against the merely existing, even where or just because the existing was normatively dominant and enforced by all major institutions, from schooling and the job market to the police. To my mind, an enabling background for the youth culture was the messianic breakthrough and atmosphere of the October Revolution and the first ten years of the Soviet Union. True, this was denied and hidden by Stalinism, and later deeply doubted by a spectrum running from the Christian or Buddhist Left through Trotskyists to anarchists; yet the revolutionary horizon of hope was given a strong second wind by the great antifascist struggle having at its centre World War II. In this historical context the students of the 1960s wave, from Tokyo through the Berkeley campus to the Latin Quarter, rejected the privileged environs of the university and went on the streets, braving lead truncheons, tear gas, and arrests. This international scope, as well as the Vietcong Tet Offensive and its resounding echo around the world, the tentative coming to power of what was in Czechoslovakia of Dubček's time called a communism with a human face, and the image of the Great Cultural Revolution in China contributed to a heady sense of historic momentum and of possible radical turning points; as Bob Dylan sang, 'The times, they are a'changin'.[12]

The anti-establishment youth movement's horizon was to my mind clearly *utopian*, spanning the positive and negative suggestions of this term. It rightly spurned the dogmatic systems and practices of capitalist imperialism and parliamentarism as well as of Stalinist monolithism and desired a radically different societal system. However, while the movement's commitment was clear as to what it utterly rejected, it was unclear how to get there from and through the present. The

semi-digested elements of various Marxist or even genuinely Leninist heresies – in their updated version of Mao, Che or even in a way Sartre – were swamped by a centrally *anarchist* mass movement. Intimately mixing Bloch's concrete and abstract utopianism, it remained very deficient on how to anchor its revolt among workers and citizens.

This dissent erupted into overt clashes with the rulers, culminating in Europe in 1968 and then in most places ending abruptly, while in the USA the end of the acute phase may perhaps be set at the Kent State and Jackson State shootings of students in 1970 (during that May, over 100 student and Black people were killed by US 'law and order' (Katsiaficas, 120), and in Japan in the 'Red Army' faction murders of 1972 – though Narita airport struggles and guerrilla raids continued well into the nineties.[13]

2.2 Sanrizuka: alliances, violence

Compared to the Euro-American situation sketched in at the beginning, the Japanese one was in 1950–70 a peculiar variant: of my three booms, the only one obtaining was the demographic one, with the ensuing most rapid urbanisation – the city population vaulted from 28 per cent (in 1945) to 72 per cent! True, the production soared under State guidance and strict planning with an eye to exports: the average annual rate of growth was by some measurements an unprecedented 10 per cent. However, the Fordist trickle-down was in Japan always underdeveloped (cf. Morris-Suzuki and Seiyama, 13 and 28–75, and *passim*), and in hindsight we can see that after the mid-1970s even the overall high growth collapsed. Thus, on the one hand, full employment obtained after the Korean War, so that personal consumption clearly rose after 1960 and advanced from basic necessities to domestic electric appliances, colour TV, and on the more affluent end to cars (cf. Nakamura, 94). Yet the prosperity was fragile since consumption remained exceptionally low for a country of high productivity (cf. Katz, 108, 199, and 203), which means that labour exploitation had risen exponentially: many people lost more than they gained in this Japanese industrialisation spurt (cf. Hane). Thus, the 'Japanese miracle', admired worldwide by the hegemonic media also meant that by 1968 Japan's per capita GDP was US$ 1,451, less than half of the German and one third of the US GDP (Oguma, 'Japan's', 19): it was a miracle for ruling-class pride but a benefit only modestly shared with the great majority of people.

As to the improved politics after the dismantling of a wildly over-regimented and most cruel tennō-fascism, despite the

parliamentary disguise its mode remained most authoritarian or quasi-feudal, in and out of production; citizen participation from below was discouraged, articulated protests as a rule prohibited and treated as illegal. Corporations, the State, and political parties – very much including the Left-wing ones – were all authoritarian. This included the very authoritarian universities, where students underwent rote learning and were often forced into unpaid research labour, accumulating much hatred against such discipline: we have an affecting testimony of a Nihon University student that behind the barricades of 1968, in the student-run classes with guest speakers, they felt 'they were "taking real university courses for the first time"; graffiti scrawled on his school's walls proclaimed: "Now we are students"' (Oguma, 'Japan's', 11).

Perhaps the most important case of a long-lasting anti-State and direct democracy coalition from below in Japan was the protest against the building of Narita airport, usually referred to as the *Sanrizuka Movement* 1965–78 (I take most of my data from the able Apter and Sawa book *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan*, and Andrews, chapter 8). It may be atypical but it marks an extreme possibility. It was 'a rare example of a residents' movement uniting firmly and lastingly with the New Left' (Andrews, 170), but this rarity is full of meaning. It started in 1965 as the local farmers' protest against the seizure of their land to build Narita airport, itself only a crass example of the post-1960 sacrifice of the interests of working farmers in favour of selected industries and exports, called euphemistically (and wrongly) the 'income doubling' policy. In 1967, some New Left factions and the Beheiren citizen movement joined in, making of this an unprecedented, albeit only local, alliance of working farmers, revolting students, and dissident intellectuals.

I am leaving aside here the fascinating history of a radical, and often violent, dissent tradition in Japan that testifies to how collective conflicts of farmers, workers, and/or the urban dissenters are as old as intolerable State encroachments on their ways of life and livelihood. As the classical work by Sansom underlined: 'There is evidence in past history that the Japanese people are, despite the rigid structure of society, by no means incapable of revolt against what they deem oppression.' Referring to the agrarian revolts, riots, and religious martyrdoms in feudal times, he concluded: 'The very fact that the social pressure has in the past been so severe and unrelenting raises a presumption that, once the course of events removes that pressure, their reactions will be strong if not violent' (Sansom, vii). This conclusion is, *mutatis mutandis*, also applicable to at least the first thirty years after World War II, and it rightly forms the leitmotif of Andrews's sweeping book

on decades of dissent. In Chiba prefecture itself, 'there was also a his-
tory of tax wars, rice riots, and land-tenant rebellions – that is, a tradi-
tion of hamlet resistance to centralized authority' (Apter and Sawa, 53)
including 'peasant rebellions … in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury' (ibid., 34) – and they were studied by the local tradesman-poet
and main Hantai Dōmei (Resistance Alliance or Opposition Federation)
organiser, Tomura Issaku, whose favourite inspiration was Thomas
Münzer. Significantly, 'the "mother movement" of the Sanrizuka strug-
gle [was] a movement of women in opposition to a military base on
Mount Fuji … going on since 1947 and develop[ing] tactics later
adopted by the Hantai Dōmei' (ibid., 57). Thus, I reluctantly focus
now only on the issue and causality of violence in Phase 1 of the
Sanrizuka struggle.

Many farmers in the central part of fertile Chiba prefecture, where
after the Meiji restoration an experimental Imperial Household
land-holding carried out interesting zootechnical research, had been
granted their land 'for eternity' as indigent demobilised soldiers after
World War II, and spent two decades of backbreaking work on
neglected soil to make it fertile. Beside breach of faith for many, all of
them were now subjected to the indignity of pressure and bribery to sell
their plots or be simply expropriated. Second, they were all subjected to
intolerable encroachment not only by the mastodontic constructions of
a huge airport, its fumes and noises, as well as by the ugly commercial
constructions of outlying airport servicing that sprang up in droves, but
also by,

> an underground jungle of drainage ditches, sewers, pipelines, ca-
> bles, conduits, and so on … [that] altered the ecology of the area.
> Water levels have dropped; wells have gone brackish and have
> dried up. The age-old irrigation system that is crucial to
> wet farming and rice production has largely been destroyed.
> (ibid., 27)

Even in neighbouring Shibayama, where there was no major eviction
from land,

> noise pollution and road, dam, overpass, and railway line construc-
> tion … affected the water table ([the] flooding and draining neces-
> sary for rice cultivation), [leading to] the depletion of woods and
> the removal of natural fertilizers, thus increasing the farmers' de-
> pendence on expensive chemical fertilizers. (ibid., 33)

In brief, a whole difficult but balanced way of life was condemned out of hand and without any discussion – a sterling example of *structural violence*.

The farmers reacted with exemplary organisation, creating a participant direct democracy based on 1,500 households. Their *counter-violence* started when efficacious non-violent protests were met by *obvious State violence*, in which riot police used clubs, tear gas, and water cannons, so that losing the land – that is, the farmers' way of living – became an immediate prospect. Both these types of manifest violence were adumbrated in the late 1967 battles against the first land survey to determine further expropriations: when dousing surveyors and then the police 'with human excrement brought in plastic bags and fired by means of long-handled wooden dippers' (ibid., 87) did not suffice; the roads were blocked, and the police beat the farmers mercilessly. Both obvious State violence and the Hantai Dōmei counter-violence had jelled as the norm of frontal collisions by early 1971, during the first expropriation wave of those who could not be bribed:

> Each side came to favor [violence as its strategy], the Hantai Dōmei because they were getting desperate and the Airport Authority and the [Chiba] governor because [less violent] means had been exhausted. For the Hantai Dōmei, violence meant a last-ditch stand, in the literal sense of the term. The prospect for them was that the Airport Authority would otherwise pick off the last few diehards by force and leave them victims without compensation … (ibid., 94)

The farmers fought with their tools, but by that year they were joined by three New Left factions, militant students from Tokyo and elsewhere, who had experience in guerrilla tactics and used long wooden staves and Molotov cocktails.

Who were these intervening youth activists?

> [They belonged] to an authentic radical tradition in Japan … Most turn out to be serious, intelligent young men and women trying to find an appropriate way to reconcile the principles they believe in with the life they lead. Less hypocritical than most armchair radicals, probably less informed, and certainly less intellectual, they [we]re at once more modest and more presumptuous. (ibid., 39)

Often led by the militants of the 'Anpo 1960' generation, these New Left youngsters were most intimately resisting the controlled society (*kanri shakai*). They rejected parliamentarism and the rigid institutional structure prevailing in State, school, and corporation, often voting with their feet – that is, walking out of job prospects and the hegemonic legal and social practices, out of marriages in the case of women (see ibid., 69). A cynical retrospect might note that often they did not have much choice, since only 31 per cent of the graduating students secured office jobs in 1967 (Oguma, 'Japan's', 9).

This student generation's feeling was well, if somewhat amateurishly, put in a poem by Saitō Susumu, a student who entered Tokyo University of Education in 1968, which I excerpt here:

> I study without any purpose/ I'm fed up with such a life/ My life is like a paper painted/ With blue and gray colour/ With plenty of water/ I do not live/ I am made to live/ I want to live humanly/ Humanly/ Human/ Not a monkey but human/ Not a machine but human/ I don't know/ But/ For human beings/ Living used to be joyful/ Human beings are domesticated/ Why on earth/ Is everyday life/ So gloomy? (Andō, 55)

The militants or activists in direct action 'were very creative in developing various repertoires of direct action: the zigzag or snake-dancing demonstration; occupation of a symbolic space … ; confrontations with the riot police by demonstrators wearing colour-coded helmets and carrying wooden fighting staves [and sometimes iron pipes, DS]; distribution of flowers to passers-by on the streets, and so on' (Apter and Sawa, 82); the wooden staves were, at least at the beginning, thought of as non-violent symbolic resistance. Deeply desiring to change the way they live, Zengakuren students were torn between achieving a fulfilling self-transformation and directly democratic political objectives. Fortunately, these objectives came together in a number of protests, the longest of which was the Sanrizuka struggle.

The militants involved comprised only a small portion out of a huge student population. In 1963 Japan had 270 universities with 763,000 students, or one-sixth of its age bracket (compared to one-fortieth in 1935), and the number grew yearly by leaps and bounds, roughly doubling by end of decade. However, in 1970 the 400 mushrooming private universities – out of 475 in all – attended by three-quarters of Japan's students got less than one-half of the money spent by the State on

higher education (McCormack, 49). This meant that a rising proportion of students had to work their way through college, that they very often lived in terrible moral and material constrictions (most student rooms in 1966 were cubicles of 3 to 4.5 tatami mats, 5 to 7.5 square metres), and finally that the huge increase in numbers greatly diminished the social status of university graduates, so that only graduating from two or three top universities led to enrolment into the ruling class – employment in a top company or prominent government office. A 1959 government survey of day-school university found that their fathers were: in agriculture 13 per cent, 'craft or labour' 3 per cent, and others 10 per cent; of the remainder I would guesstimate the families of a real upper class (the rich and rulers) at 4–8 per cent, which leaves 75–80 per cent for all fractions of the 'middle' class, metropolitan and provincial (Tsurumi, 316 and 322; Oguma, 'Japan's', 7; the proportion of 3/4 non-working class was similar in the UK).

It is also not clear what proportion of students more or less actively participated in the 'Anpo 70' wave of Zenkyōtō protests; one estimate puts it at a maximum of 20 per cent, which would still be a pool of around 300,000 people (Oguma, 'Japan's', 5; Andrews, 81). However, careful differentiations would have to be made between Tokyo and the probable smaller percentages at provincial universities, as well as between leaders, rank-and-file activists, intermittent activists, and non-activists (Krauss, 24, 94 and *passim*); Andrews estimates for the peak year 1969 a maximum of 53,500 'active in some way' (Krauss, 94; cf. also Sunada 463–5, and Knaudt, 11). But when the rest of students were partly or fully indifferent to politics, even 20 per cent indicates a supporting nucleus of a whole university generation. Furthermore, the support was not confined to students: in 1978, of the 200 people arrested in the Sanrizuka struggle, over 60 per cent were workers, and 20–30 per cent were public servants (Andrews, 171).

Last but not least, the Sanrizuka Alliance's was 'a struggle of farm households and hamlets and villages [fighting to preserve full-time farming] against a state policy that threaten[ed] their survival. And because that struggle ha[d] so many historical and cultural aspects as well as political ones, it … struck a wider and more responsive core than anyone … anticipated' (Apter and Sawa, 48). This was made possible by the intervention of a third ally, coming from a variant of what was called after 1945 the 'progressive intellectuals' (*kakushin ínteri*). They were a new ideologico-political fraction, a highly articulate, often Marxist-oriented intelligentsia which had won prestige and influence

among the more highly educated reading public, mindful of the ravages under militarism. All of them were committed to some form of responsive democracy, ideologically ranging from utopian liberalism and anarchism to the most orthodox pseudo-Leninism of the Russian or Chinese stripe, though the majority held aloof from party politics and could be called libertarian socialists; they had had the experience of mobilising in the First Anpo struggles. Even when in the 1960s the split between the bourgeois liberal and New Left horizons grew more acute, as epitomised in the opposition between Maruyama Masao and Yoshimoto Takaaki, the great majority held that peace and socialism went together. Many of them opposed the US war in Vietnam as passionately as any student 'sect', so that bolstering the existence of mega-airports – which would certainly help the US military too[14] – was a black mark for them.

The intellectuals and other *bunkajin* (people of culture), such as the musician Okabayashi Nobuyasu, were crucial in generating sympathy and support among the population at large. Already the First Anpo anti-treaty movement organised by the Left had the sympathy, at least as far as anti-militarism goes, of probably a majority of the Japanese people in 1959 and 1960. In the later wave, to see on TV and read about dignified small proprietors of land, and in some cases their women and elders, beaten bloody in Sanrizuka generated probably even larger sympathy and a deal of public support difficult to quantify, but acting as a brake against quicker and even more violent repression.

Eventually, in the two 1971 waves of expropriation and after them, the bulldozers of the Airport Authority Corporation cleared the land of trees, houses, farms, and people; six people were killed in Sanrizuka struggles, hundreds wounded, and thousands arrested. The oppositional alliance did not give up for thirteen years, and it revived in the eighties; Narita airport, a third of its originally planned size, is still planning its third runway.

2.3 Toward some conclusions: spacetime, agents, horizons

Let me enrich my argument with a brief comparison to some central characteristics of the French May '68, where the youth revolt can perhaps best be seen and about which we certainly know most. As different from Japan, 'normal' work and life unexpectedly came to a full standstill in *all of* France, cut off from the world for fifteen days, with up to 10 million protesters or strikers out of 28 million voters, and with a paralysed government machine. The class lines were hugely simplified into a

frontal opposition between, on one hand, dependent labour – which the students identified as their future and partly already their present – and on the other hand those who commanded the working people plus the State machine that insured the command. Most of the half a million French students 'contested the system' (as in Japan) out of a deep conviction that it was imposing upon them a role and social identity – that is, duties and limitations – which they hated, scorned, and refused: one was a node in a badly knit, rigid and oppressive, societal web. Finally, even those who found a place in the economic machinery would lead a professionally and socially frustrating life of obedience and intellectual decay: the intellectuals were being proletarianised (Magri, 84–6 and 272). Thus, the students radically refused the whole web.

In particular, this meant the total refusal of a merely national and/or 'confessional' identity, evident in the slogan defending Cohn-Bendit against the Right wing and the French Communist Party (PCF): 'We are all German Jews.' What Rossanda wrote about May 1968 in France is true of the student protests worldwide: they were also 'the last [joyous] spurt of internationalism' ('Il riso'). In their decentralised way, they were historically the first worldwide insurrectional movement. What is more, this combative internationalism was built on 'the critique of American imperialism and that nation's war in Vietnam' (Ross, 'Establishing', 651, and cf. Klimke and Scharloth (eds), vii and *passim*) and a symmetrical refusal of the petrified 'really existing socialism' Russian-stripe. The protests ranged from Senegal to North America, from Brasil to China, and through most of Europe. They were everywhere ludic and humorous but the play led directly to political action, they were without a central organisational apparatus: 'transgression and creation went hand in hand' (Lefebvre, 86). As Kristin Ross pinpointed it:

> [S]tudents and intellectuals [managed to] break with the identity of a particular social group with particular self-interests and accede to something larger, to politics in the sense that Rancière gives it, or to what Maurice Blanchot has singled out as the specific force of May: 'in the so-called "student" action, students never acted as students but rather as revealers of a general crisis, as bearers of a power of rupture putting into question the regime, the State, society'. (*May*, 25; Blanchott cited from 'Sur le mouvement', repr. in *Lignes*, 33 (March 1998), 177)

Significantly, 'pleasure [was displaced to] the workings of a different social order that the May movement, temporarily, accomplished, in the

invention of new forms of direct democracy' (Ross, *May*, 103); 'the denial is already an affirmation of freedom, play, and joy' (Rossanda, *L'anno*, 91). The Parisian occupations, for example, were egalitarian, debureaucratised, and creative, no doubt at times rawly extremist and very time-consuming. Their defeat was the utopian swan-song of the epoch that opened in 1917 – and the breakthrough of the capillary police state and increasing servitude ever since (see for France, Ross, *May*, 28–64 and *passim*).

In France as in Japan, significant parts of the intellectuals, especially workers in TV, cinema, theatre, literature, and schools, but also at the very top (graduates of the 'Grandes Ecoles'), seriously questioned the sense of their work and of the social order: not since the wartime antifascist resistance had there been such a wide disaffection of both youth – including in France quite clearly young workers, especially the unqualified ones, and lower technicians – and intellectuals (cf. Magri, 50, 75, 98–107, and 254–7).

In France as in Japan the youth protest movements in and around 1968 embraced, where they had to, a counter-violence to the immediately intervening and obvious police and paramilitary State violence (cf. on this enforced dynamics Vidal-Naquet, 1963). True, many Japanese activist factions eventually went for much quite unjustifiable group violence (*uchi-geba*), possibly often led by police *agents provocateurs*, including even torture to death (cf. Andrews, ch. 7; on p.324, he cites an estimate of 4,388 casualties between 1968 and 1976, of which 47 deaths). And in the worldwide youth protests there clearly was also a temptation toward a 'romanticism of pure violence' as a fascistoid absolute (Lefebvre, 71). As a general rule, parts of the anomic working class and especially of the petty-bourgeoisie were prone to a spontaneous fascism of self-actualisation through indiscriminate destruction, as formulated, say, from the Italian Futurists on. Yet the protesters' forms of symbolic communication were also in good part non-violent. They were partly *semiotic*: improvised direct bodily contact arms (no guns except for the counterproductive Japanese 'Red Army' faction), ways of collective behaviour (headbands and armbands in various colours indicating political allegiance, snake-dancing, a use of community festival [*matsuri*] jostling and excitement elements in cementified Tokyo), use of 'liberated' space (teach-ins, sit-ins, love-ins, the Sorbonne as *Commune étudiante*, the Odéon theatre in Paris, the 'towers' in Sanrizuka) or of contested space (the streets, Shinjuku station in Tokyo). But they were also *semantic*: there was huge language work on formulating ideological objectives and an accompanying outpouring of short written exhortations and polemics distributed *en masse* (Oguma, 'What', found

about 5,000 flyers and pamphlets only from the Tokyo University 1968–9 revolt). Much larger than even this mass written sediment was the incessant explosion of spoken word always *en situation*, in debates, slogans, ironies, brilliant improvisations, 'a culture traversed by hope … a vast social therapeutics' (Lefebvre, 86); this was encapsulated in striking, still living slogans of 'Power to the imagination'. 'Be realistic, demand the impossible,' or the Morrisian 'Beneath the pavement, the beach.' Participating in both oral-cum-written semantics and space semiotics were the calligraphic slogans painted on various supports, also an echo of peasant revolt styles.

As to the global mass media of the time, they were as a rule, in Goebbels's term, *gleichgeschaltet*; the ideologies of consensus as enforced by them were naturally a prime target of the student revolts. But the exceptions were very important: and primarily the CBS evening news of Walter Cronkite, that gave at least a partially critical view of the US army side in the Vietnam War. In France the radio was decisive for spreading the protest, and for the first time in history, staffs of the French TV stations swung them against the ruling power. Beside oral debates, offset printing, and radio, tape recorders, and new visual forms (the 16 mm movie with synchronised sound, beginnings of experimental videos) were widely used in Europe. New forms of film-making from 1967–8 on, first documentary and then feature – Godard, Makavejev, and many others – were directly continuous with the protest movement (cf. Ortoleva, 135–6 and 217–18). Everywhere, the movement refused any negotiation with the State authorities or coopted media (cf. Ross, 'Establishing', *passim*).

To my mind, the main historical achievement of the youth movement came about in the USA, where it was closely allied with the anti-Vietnam War movement and in a dialogue with the Black Liberation movement. For globally, the youth revolt's single great and very important victory was to contribute to ending the US intervention in Vietnam. As concerns all other major collective and radical aims and instances, we should acknowledge it *failed*. The ruling hegemony everywhere, even in France, proved finally stronger than the numerically sometimes very large contestant masses, because these were not sufficiently clear in their ideas nor organised to act according to them. In other words, despite some notable successes – such as the huge wave of worker strikes in France, the 1 to 1.5 million people marching through Tokyo on 23 June 1970, or on a smaller scale the support of the citizenry in the 1968 Sasebo base siege in Japan (cf. Usami, 235–6) – this major protest movement was defeated. It became adept at Gramsci's war of manoeuvre but not at all at the long-duration war of position, what Brecht's

Mother Courage called *die lange Wut* (the long anger). The youth protests either never fully embarked – except perhaps in the USA together with the Black movement – upon the struggle for the hearts and minds of the majority of the population; or they lost it under pressure of murderous State violence (as in the case of the US Black Panthers); or as in France, they won it for a while but did not know what to do with it.[15] I think it should be one of our *desiderata* to begin accounting for this.

This is not meant as holier-than-thou blaming. For one thing, it is difficult to think of radical changes towards social justice in the global North without a wide belief by key classes that they are in an inescapable economic and existential crisis – which certainly did not obtain at that time. This said, I should add to the central tensions of movement vs. party and time vs. space a further and more obvious one in the youth movement: all the protesters wanted to achieve a sense of personal fulfilment, but at least their active core also wanted to achieve anti-war, directly democratic political objectives. Theoretically, these two aims were not necessarily mutually exclusive but could harmonise, as in every significant revolution, and they largely did so in the Sanrizuka struggle and in the French May. In Japan the self-oriented therapeutic variants, called self-transformation (*jiko henkaku),* self-negation (*jiko hitei*), and self-examination, seemed to participate in two diverging horizons: on the one hand a legitimate wish for personal self-determination, on the other hand an infiltration of the US myth of the 'autonomous individual'. The strong fixation on 'spontaneity' and on an inward turn seems to have become eventually divorced from overall political objectives and from the horizon of collective self-government. An ever-present tension thus came to prevail between radically changing on the one hand *the personal interiority of each* and on the other hand *the social structure determining all*.[16] Despite the rebels' sincere hatred of the ruling system, attacks on central sociopolitical nodes were never a clear objective and where tried were defeated. Thus, the individualist horn of the dilemma, formulated by an activist as 'Rather than question whether a thing can be done or not, the essential is to give full expression to oneself' (Fukashiro, cited in Eckersall, 20), appears to have won out in the aftermath of the protest movement. As Rossanda perspicaciously concluded about the Paris 1968 students, 'Dirsi è quasi essere, dire è quasi fare' (To speak out about oneself (literally: to speak one's self) is almost to be, to speak is almost to act – in 'Il riso'): fatal mistake of all of us intellectuals, confusing the necessary with the sufficient factor. Terayama's Tenjō Sajiki troupe slogan, 'to revolutionise real life without resorting

to politics' (Andrews, 259), was exceptional among *angura* theatre groups, but it became the sominant motto of the reflux. This proved eminently cooptable by capitalism (cf. Boltanski and Chiapello).[17]

What was lacking for a real prospect of success in France was, as in Japan, a mass workers' movement led by a radical political force: the horizon of the French May '68 was 'the union of intellectual contestation with workers' struggle' (Ross, *May*, 74). On the opposite side, just as in Japan, the main allies of the State apparatus proved to be not the few easily mobilised and vicious right-wing thugs but the supposedly left-wing (both communist and socialist) parties and trade unions – *entirely in the 'communist' variant and almost entirely in the 'socialist' one*. Yet implicitly, the final horizon of the '1968' contestation movements was a kind of libertarian socialism or communism, with a healthy practice of direct democracy prevailing. If the lessons from Japan and France are compared, a first conclusion is that the general strike – argued for by Sorel but best developed by Luxemburg – proved to be a formidable invention (cf. ibid., 76–8): but not if permanently disjoined from Lenin's at least equally formidable invention of a democratic-centralist vanguard party. The general strike operates in and liberates *time*; liberating enough space to be partly in power is a precondition for this. Virilio somewhere noted that the general strike is superior to barricades because it is a barricade in time; yet so can also be a political party.

To this conclusion about the spacetime horizon, an agential conclusion is to be added. For the 'really obtaining' world Left, the consequences of the student tsunami were epochal and deeply ambiguous. On the one hand, it finally destroyed the credibility of the Stalinist centralised party that stifled all spontaneity not controlled by it and turned out to be (in a favourite term of theirs) 'objectively' counter-revolutionary – entirely in the 'communist' variant and almost entirely in the 'socialist' one.[18] If there were to be a new coordinating hegemony, such a 'party' could not be simply a State power-holder but it would then have to become primarily the leader of depth social movements, forsaking the triune Bolshevik model of delegation of decision to professional politicians, the shaping of this group by cooptation from above, and a unity working from above downwards (Magri, 286–7). This was of a piece with a redefinition of the oppressed, exploited, and potentially revolutionary subjects as not only the industrial proletariat but all 'direct producers', very much including brain workers (clearest perhaps in Krahl, *Konstitution*, 334 and *passim*, and in Magri), early on best undergirded by the general approach of Marcuse and with a survey of attempts at defining it in Rossanda, *L'anno* (pp.55–72 and 111–27);

however, such formulation remained an often begun but lengthy task, developing in later years. The rethinking might have been very salutary had it brought about an imperative return to Marx's, and in good part Lenin's, flexible political organisation with a clear guiding – but, as Gramsci auspicated, not necessarily commanding – nucleus plus a whole electronic cloud of self-organised activities around it; and even the nucleus might openly acknowledge it had different particles. Japan showed that a plebeian class alliance or historical block from below was possible, and France that it needed countrywide dimensions; but the main lesson from both is that it crucially needed also a *historically conscious agent* aware of previous battles and not only generationally transient. Yet the youth movement brought forth no lasting organisational form of that kind; its necessity was during the protests clear only to a few heretical Marxists. A rich specific position, focused with Fanon and Che on the Third World resistance, on Marx's 'thinking and suffering humanity' (Dutschke, 69) and on Council direct democracy was Rudi Dutschke's (see all three titles). It was very convenient for the rulers, to say the least, that both Dutschke and Krahl were eliminated by physical lesion.

True, the existing forms of the sociopolitical system also proved rather fragile – even though propped up by all existing parties and the trade union leaders of their observance: most prominently in France, Japan, and Yugoslavia, not to mention most of the Soviet Bloc (with the shining but fragile and still inchoate exception of Dubčekian Czechoslovakia). It became quite clear that the 'liberal' bourgeois centrism, once it started shedding the Welfare State, was a naked emperor. After a few years of improvisation, the oil-shock of 1973 provided a welcome excuse for the Thatcherist and Reaganist abandonment of the Welfare State in favour of class war from above, that eventually led to a deeper polarisation of billionaires and misery, an increasingly cynical Right wing, and galloping narcissism. Wallerstein has argued many times that 'what happened in 1968 was the ending of the geocultural dominance of centrist liberalism and the reopening of a three-way ideological struggle between the Global Left and the Global Right, with centrist liberalism struggling to maintain some support as a real alternative'; this has turned out to be too sanguine, but it clarifies the proper horizon of choice (in an efficient smokescreen, the Right called itself neo-liberal).

Last but not least, we ought to take into account the cost of the 1968 moment and its failure to the various national body politics and human life on the planet. In Japan, it was summarised by Andrews as: 'The Iron Triangle of LDP government, bureaucracy and big business rules supreme – and flounders when faced with a crisis, whether political, economic or natural' (p.307). The cost we are paying for the huge

'capitalocene' disasters is high indeed, and growing: it is omnipresent ecocide and structural violence (for which the decay of Japanese agriculture can stand as example); far too often also genocide; all accompanied by the triumph of capitalist 'unique thought' and horror horizons that would have horrified not only eighteenth- but also nineteenth-century bourgeois thinkers – say Diderot and J.S. Mill.

Notes

1 Among a whole library of writings about the 1968 moment in general, the Caute and (better) Ortoleva title agree that the central themes were: a global revolt against the 'productivist' modernisation of capitalism – including the epicycle of 'really existing socialism' – and how it represses people, and against the dominant political ideologies in both camps whose mainstays were authoritarianism, bureaucracy, and hypocrisy.

2 The canniest leaders of youth knew it, amid illusions about the movement's endurance, see Cohn-Bendit's interview.

3 This entails *politics* of some (not necessarily antagonistic) kind being consubstantial to human society as such, whereas *violence* could be banished from a truly just – let us say classless – society. It also means that Marx's persuasion that politics involves only class struggles is either terminologically or substantially wrong, and it was pernicious in the history of socialist power and left-wing movements.

   I am aware of parting company on violence, very gladly, from 98 per cent of our 'unique thought' media and apologetics. This percentage is derived from a perusal of 100 bibliographies on violence, from which I found only two theoretically useful. We need Dōgen's 'piercing cognition'.

   My warm thanks for suggestions and materials go first to the conference organisers Maja Vodopivec and William Marotti and to the other keynote speaker Sakai Naoki, then for matters Japanese to Mark Selden and especially C. Douglas Lummis; also to Dick Boer, Jerry Harris, Emilia Karaboeva, Mladen Lazić, Tom Moylan, Tijana Okić, Joan Roelofs, Bülent Somay, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Michael Stöppler, Victor Strazzeri, and Victor Wallis who helped considerably, especially where they objected. If no translator is indicated, translations are mine.

4 Popitz elaborates the central libertarian tradition of J.S. Mill's in *On Liberty* (1859), that, 'The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others' (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harm_principle), and broadened this into an interesting casuistic. The tradition clearly stemmed from the US and French Revolutions; the latter's *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* of 1789 states in Article 2: 'Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the fruition of these same rights.'

5 I base this on Suvin, 'Access' and 'Exploring'. It should be pointed out that the state of violence theory seems to be unsettled if not deficient, to begin with in its failure to ponder and ponderate the role of war, revolution, and terrorism (see the splendid Hobsbawm, also Shaw 'Conceptual').

On terrorism, I reproduce here for the reader's convenience the Table from my 'Exploring' (in 2004 – detailed justifications are to be found there):

Civilians Killed by State Terrorism (main instances in last 40 years):

During US intervention in Vietnam	over 2,000,000
US-inspired Indonesian army pogrom of 'Communists', 1965–66	500,000–over 1,000,000
Intervention by South African, French, and US proxies in Angola and Mozambique	over 500,000
During US bombing in Kampuchea	at least 200–400,000
By the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea	ca. 200–400,000
US bombings and proxies in Laos	ca. 350,000
By the Indonesian army in East Timor	up to 300,000
US-organised army repression in Guatemala, 1962–96	200,000
By the Indonesian army in western Irian (New Guinea)	80,000
US-organised army repression in El Salvador, 1978 on	70,000
By the Russian army in the Chechnya secession war	perhaps 40–65,000
By the Turkish army against Kurds, 1984 on	several tens of thousands (number not found)
Argentinian 'disappeared' and others killed, 1976–83	perhaps 45,000
Israeli and US excursions into Lebanon, 1982–96	ca. 38,000
US bombings of Iraqis in 1991 Gulf War	perhaps 20,000 or more

Counted as 'smaller fry', but think about each of these zeroes as being many bodies in pain and terror: US-organised Contras in Nicaragua: 7,000; Iraqi poison gassing of Kurds 1988: ca. 5,000; US-organised army repression in Chile: at least 3,000; Israeli military killings of Palestinians: several thousand (number not found) up to 1993 (including the first Intifada) and at least 2,000 from 2000 on; US invasion of Panama 1989: 2–3,000; US and NATO bombings of Serbia: 2,000.

A special case is the killings of civilians by the US army, mercenaries, and allies in the two wars ongoing at the time not only because they were open-ended, but also because there is an argument, they should be called war crimes. However, since no war was declared and since the Bush Jr administration does not apply the Geneva Conventions on war prisoners,

more mileage might be got by treating these one-sided wars as State terrorism:

US and allies' intervention in Afghanistan 2002 on	4,000 (and counting)
US and UK army and allies during Iraq invasion from 2003 on	10,000 or much more (and counting)

Civilians Killed by Group Terrorism (main instances in last 40 years):

Italy (by 'Red Brigades' and neo-fascists), 1968–82	334
Palestinian killings of Israelis, 1968–81	282
Germany (by RAF and others), 1970–79	31
GLOBAL TOTAL 1969–80 (CIA estimate)	3,368
[Other estimates 1980–2000 are on the same order of magnitude]	
Oklahoma City bombing, 1995	ca. 150
Palestinian killings of Israelis during first Intifada	ca. 700
Killings in Bangladesh (mainly by 'Islamist fundamentalists'), 1996–2003	ca. 100
'Islamist fundamentalists' based in Chechnya 1999 on	over 1,000
Palestinian killings of Israelis during second Intifada 2000 on	up to 900
Al Qaeda attack against USA, Sep. 2001	ca. 3,000
Killings in India (mainly by 'Islamist fundamentalists') 2001–2004	ca. 200
Bali nightclub explosions by 'Islamist fundamentalists' Oct. 2002	over 200
Al Qaeda attack on Madrid commuters, 2004	ca. 200

6 See on war Suvin, 'Capitalism'; to its extensive bibliography up to 2000, at least the three titles by Martin Shaw should be added.

 I shall also completely exclude from my discussion so-called individual violence, as both very complex in causal terms and irrelevant to my focus. A great majority of hegemonic approaches to violence are the multifarious 'public health' ones. They may be pragmatically more or less necessary and useful, but they are usually – as in the representative WHO title – divided into seven categories, of which six deal with individual violence. The last one is on 'collective violence', a laudable but insufficient step. Their major failure is a myopic empiricism that puts mass State violence on the same level of analysis as infectious diseases.

7 An excellent example was the West German government's fight to limit liabilities and reparation payments for the Nazi genocide of German Jews to 'material' injury; this might include damage to properties and actual medical injury but not lasting psychic injuries. The government deployed testimonies of its tame psychiatrists in support of this propertarianism – term by Ursula Le Guin – mixed with a good dose of anti-Semitism (see Herzog, ch. 3).

8 Cf. also Shigematsu, 170 and *passim*. My delimitations do not coincide with the direct action that the Zengakuren militants called '*gewalt (gebaruto)*' or 'counter-violence *(taikô bôryoku)*', though I have attempted to learn from their experiences.

9 The first and third citation in this paragraph are from Marcuse, 'Problem', 89 (in Adams), for the high incidence of army use in the USA for repressing protest, amounting to an average 18 interventions and 12,000 troops per year, and the documentation on the FBI's COINTELPRO programme of repression, which included the assassination of the Black Panthers' leadership (in Churchill and Wall). Cf. a general pointer to police violence as precipitating a response in Tilly, which was, with his other works and those of Marcuse, of influence on my arguments. The historical evidence seems to confirm that the protest movements tended to be non-violent until convinced this led nowhere; I argue this in my analysis of the Sanrizuka struggle in part 2, and the same is clear for Nihon University struggles after the 13 June 1968 attack by armed right-wingers (Akita, 11); for Italy, an obvious watershed was the 1968 'battle of Villa Giulia', cf. Jan Kurtz and Marica Tolomelli in Klimke and Scharloth (eds), 89–90.

10 I have profited much from his article, which at times I paraphrase without citation, both for data and notions. He argues that Sorel's account of 'proletarian violence', pivoting on the General Strike, can be understood as such revolutionary non-violence, as can, on a smaller scale, the strike and the boycott as primary forms of struggle against capital (see Karatani, 291).

However, the concept of non-violence remains epistemologically unclear – as most saturated by mass media, social media, and the ubiquity of nuclear power.

11 Nonetheless there remain at least two major epistemological problems into which I cannot enter here. First, why has anticapitalist revolt since the 1968 moment, if not earlier, shifted from a centrally working-class basis to so-called marginal groups (the 'Third World', women, new 'working' classes, etc.). The first sketch of a thesis about it can be found in Lefebvre, who argues that in the Marcusean totally dominated society only marginal groups such as 'intellectual creators … perceive and conceive society as a whole' (citation). Students were 'virtual sellers' of the very specific *cognitive labour-power*; though kept marginalised, theirs was an essential productive activity in the Cold War. This is clear from the enormous mushrooming of student numbers and universities after World War II – significantly led by the USA, with 4 million students at that moment and an estimated 30 per cent of Gross National Product arising out of the 'knowledge industry' (Davidson, 334). The capitalist concept of knowledge as a capital leads to enormous and ever worsening problems of dispossession and alienation, a contradiction that led to the students' generalised contestation. This meant many young intellectuals felt solidarity with the working class but understood better than 'the single proletarian' the functioning of society and its repressive mechanisms (Lefebvre, 90 and 94, cf. also 69–70, 88–9, and *passim*). This early argumentation is incomplete and should beware of slipping toward a managerial technocracy.

I have found no illuminating analyses of working-class youth in the 1960s.

Second, the perennial historiosophic problem of *periodisation*. No doubt, one could find a 'long 1960s' (Klimke and Scharloth (eds), vii) from the mid-1950s to roughly 1977, but this is not our brief here. The 'short 1960s', pivoting on the '1968 moment', seem to begin at some (nationally variable) point in the early to mid-1960s and end in 1971–2.

12 Oguma assumes in 'What' that the mutual knowledge of various national '1968' movements was mostly based on imperfectly understood TV and other media glimpses. This is clearly wrong for western and central Europe: for one example, Klimke and Scharloth group all national narratives within a framework of transnational roots and networks. Nor does it at all hold for the ubiquitous inspiration drawn from US Black protests and student sit-ins. I would argue that the overall drift and momentum were fairly clear across national borders and the ideological connections numerous (cf. also Gilcher-Holtey, Katsiaficas, and Klimke and Scharloth (eds), which has a further general bibliography in ch. 8). Even if mass air travel to and from the Japanese islands only took off in the 1970s, Oguma's assumption is falsified by the simple example of *Asahi Journal* weekly's featuring in June 1968 a nearly 40-part photo-essay series on 'Student Power' across the whole world (Marotti, 'One', 7–8).

13 See for this 'long 68' Andrews, 177–82. I do not at all pretend to give an encompassing overview either of all essential aspects of the Anpo 70 youth protests or of their unfolding.

14 And of course, the whole Japanese industrial system was mightily helping US wars in Asia since the Korean one, and in particular the rail system connecting the bases; a standard estimate is that 'millions of gallons' of jet fuel went alone through the contested Shinjuku rail knot (Marotti, 'One', 25).

15 Here I converge with Badiou's position (pp.35–6) on the 'communist hypothesis'.

16 These oppositions seem homologous to the poles of *self-reflection vs. self-liberation* in Andö, 68–76. Of course, the whole dichotomy of society vs. individual presupposes the waning of the precapitalist notion that the macrocosm and the microcosm are analogous, say in Plato or in the Chinese principle *zhi shen zhi guo*, 'to govern oneself and the State'.

I cannot enter here into a final, often noted and possibly central opposition, between the Old Left stress on exploitation and the New Left one on alienation. My point about not confusing the necessary and sufficient cognitive factors would apply here. To the extent such confusion prevailed, both the Old and New Left failed.

17 I wish I could do at least a small sketch of the 'cultural' fallout of the 1960s protest wave to which I was a witness, but neither space nor time allow it. I can offhand think first of the widespread 'street' and 'guerrilla' theatre in the USA, culminating in the Living Theatre (exiled to Europe) and the San Francisco Mime troupe, of the songs of Joan Baez and much Bob Dylan at the time, and then of four masterpieces directly inspired by the youth rebellion: Želimir Žilnik's movie *Early Works* (1969), Marge Piercy's SF novel *Dance the Eagle to Sleep* (1970), John Lennon and Yoko Ono's *Imagine* (1971), Dušan Makavejev's movie *WR – Mysteries of the Organism* (1971), and Satoh Makoto's play and performance *Tsubasa o moyasu tenshi-tachi no butō (The Dance of Angels Who Burn Their Wings)*, 1970–71. I analyse the last one at length in a separate piece, and Makavejev in a forthcoming long essay.

18 The Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' could be seen as a quite idiosyncratic Chinese wing of the world protest wave after the mid-60s, characterised by the youth being used by various Party and Army factions. Nonetheless, and despite Mao's intermittent efforts, the credibility of a truly revolutionary communist party was equally destroyed; what remained after Peng was a neo-Kuomintang masquerading as communist.

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